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A Self-Consistent Method to Assess Air Quality Co-Benefits from US Climate Policies 
Rebecca Saari*†, Noelle E. Selin*, Sebastian Rausch‡, Tammy M. Thompson§ 
Abstract 
Air quality co-benefits can potentially reduce the costs of greenhouse gas mitigation. However, while 
many studies of the cost of greenhouse gas mitigation model the full macroeconomic welfare impacts, 
most studies of air quality co-benefits do not. We employ a US computable general equilibrium 
economic model previously linked to an air quality modeling system, and enhance it to represent the 
economy-wide welfare impacts of fine particulate matter. We present a first application of this method 
to explore the efficiency and the distributional implications of a clean energy standard (CES) and a 
cap–and–trade (CAT) program that both reduce CO2 emission by 10% in 2030 relative to 2006. We 
find that co-benefits from fine particulate matter reduction completely offset policy costs by 110% 
(40% to 190%), transforming the net welfare impact of the CAT into a gain of $1 (-$5 to $7) billion 
2005 US$. For the CES, the corresponding co-benefit (median $8; $3 to $14)/tCO2 is a smaller 
fraction (median 5%; 2% to 9%) of its higher policy cost. The eastern US garners 78% and 71% of 
co-benefits for the CES and CAT, respectively. By representing the effects of pollution-related 
morbidities and mortalities as an impact to labor and the demand for health services, we find that the 
welfare impact per unit of reduced pollution varies by region. These interregional differences can 
enhance the preference of some regions, like Texas, for a CAT over a CES, or switch the calculation 
of which policy yields higher co-benefits, compared to an approach that uses one valuation for all 
regions. This framework could be applied to quantify consistent air quality impacts of other pricing 
instruments, subnational trading programs, or green tax swaps.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Policies for cutting CO2 emissions to mitigate climate change can improve regional air quality 
by incidentally reducing polluting activities. These air quality improvements can have welfare 
co-benefits (or ancillary benefits) that help to compensate for the cost of carbon policies. A 
growing body of literature has quantified the air quality co-benefits of carbon policy, in part to 
help identify policies that benefit air quality and climate simultaneously. However, studies of air 
quality co-benefits often use different methods to assess costs and benefits, precluding direct 
cost-benefit comparisons. Here, we develop a consistent approach to assess costs and economy-
wide air quality co-benefits, by extending and applying an economic model developed to 
estimate emissions changes and policy costs of US climate policies. Specifically, we implement 
an approach to model and quantify the economy-wide welfare implications of air pollution 
reductions, and compare these air quality impacts to the costs of two US carbon policies. 
There is mounting evidence that air quality co-benefits significantly offset the costs of 
greenhouse gas mitigation (Muller, 2012; Jack and Kinney, 2010; Ravishankara et al., 2012). 
Nemet et al. (2010) summarize 37 peer-reviewed studies that estimate the air quality co-benefits 
of climate change policy, with results ranging from $2–147/tCO2. Many assessments of the co-
benefits of climate policies use partial equilibrium or computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
economic models to estimate the costs of climate policies (Nemet et al., 2010; Bell et al., 2011; 
Burtraw et al., 2003). CGE models use general equilibrium theory to assess the long-run 
dynamics of resource allocation and income distribution in market economies. They have been 
widely applied since the early 1990s to evaluate the efficiency of environmental and energy 
policy (Bergman, 2005), including studies to estimate the cost of the US Clean Air Act and the 
Acid Rain Trading program (Hazilla and Kopp, 1990; Goulder et al., 1997). By simulating the 
entire economy, CGE models offer the advantage of estimating changes to emissions from all 
sectors, including non-regulated sectors that respond to changing prices (Scheraga and Leary, 
1994). Accounting for relative price changes throughout the economy is particularly important 
when projecting substantial climate or energy policy (Sue Wing, 2009; Bhattacharyya, 1996).  
In contrast to the well-developed literature on the macroeconomic costs of climate policies, 
studies estimating benefits use more varied methodologies, most of which do not capture 
economic effects. Early studies of the air quality co-benefits of climate policy quantified benefits 
by applying linearized $/ton estimates of avoided damages from pollutant emissions (Goulder, 
1993; Scheraga and Leary, 1994; Boyd et al., 1995). Later studies applied more detailed 
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emissions-impact relationships, including information from source–receptor atmospheric 
modeling and updated information on concentration-response functions and associated costs 
(Burtraw et al., 2003; Holmes et al., 1995; Dowlatabadi et al., 1993; Rowe et al., 1995). Health 
damages are most often valued using estimates of the Willingness to Pay (WTP) for reduced 
health risks (Bell et al., 2011). WTP estimates for reduced mortality risk, termed Value of a 
Statistical Life (VSL), comprise the majority of these benefits estimates (OIRA, 2013). 
Macroeconomic CGE analysis attempts to incorporate and build on this approach by including 
the constraints of multiple policies, limited resources, and changing prices, which can lead to 
significant indirect gains or losses (Smith and Carbone, 2007). Since top-down economic 
modeling approaches like CGE are commonly applied to estimate the costs of climate policy 
(Paltsev and Capros, 2014), a consistent assessment of the air quality co-benefits would use a 
similar approach to capture indirect gains as well as indirect losses. 
A growing number of studies have used CGE models to estimate the macroeconomic and 
welfare impacts of air pollution. These studies link the human health impacts from fine 
particulate matter and ozone to welfare loss through increased medical expenses, lost wages, 
pain and suffering, and reductions in the supply or productivity of labor. CGE models have been 
used to evaluate benefits from the US Clean Air Act (CAA) from 1975 to 2000 (Matus et al., 
2008), global ozone impacts under future climate and mitigation scenarios (Selin et al., 2009), 
and the historical burden of air pollution in Europe (Nam et al., 2010) and China (Matus et al., 
2012); however, none of these studies assessed policy costs. The US EPA’s Second Prospective 
Analysis of the CAA evaluated both human health benefits and costs using a CGE framework, 
but it used pollution changes generated outside the CGE model (US EPA, 2011). The studies 
discussed above have used CGE models either to estimate the cost of environmental policy, or 
the benefits of air pollution reductions, but not both. 
Here, we present a method for the consistent evaluation of costs and co-benefits of carbon 
policies. We present an approach to quantify the economy-wide welfare impacts of air pollution 
reductions in the same macroeconomic model used to assess emissions changes and policy costs. 
We adapt a multiregion, multisector, multihousehold CGE model of the US economy, the US 
Regional Energy Policy Model (USREP). This model was previously linked with a detailed 
emissions inventory and air quality modeling system (Thompson et al., 2014a) to estimate policy 
costs, emissions changes, pollution changes, and human health impacts. We present a first 
application of this method to a national clean energy standard and an equivalent cap–and–trade 
program. We compare the economy-wide labor and health impacts from fine particulate matter 
reductions that arise incidentally from each policy. We explore how these co-benefits affect both 
the efficiency (by reducing policy costs) and the distributional implications of each policy, by 
modeling how net co-benefits of a national policy are distributed across the continental US. With 
our more consistent co-benefits, we re-examine the question: can the impacts of air quality co-
benefits on economic resources “pay for” a climate or clean energy policy in the US? 
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2. INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT METHODS 
We use an integrated assessment framework to model policies, emissions, and impacts, shown 
in Figure 1. The United States Regional Energy Policy (USREP) economic model (Rausch et 
al., 2010) is used at the beginning and the end of our analysis process. At the beginning, USREP 
is used to implement climate policies, quantify costs, and estimate emissions changes (Rausch et 
al., 2011). The Comprehensive Air Quality Model with Extensions (CAMx) (Environ, 2011) is 
next used to link emissions to atmospheric concentrations. The Environmental Benefits Mapping 
and Analysis (BenMAP) program (Abt Associates, Inc., 2012) is used to estimate human health 
impacts related to fine particulate matter. As the methodological contribution of this paper, we 
add a final step to the analysis by using BenMAP-derived health impacts to derive estimates of 
economy-wide co-benefits in USREP. 
This section presents the USREP model, its link to our air quality modeling system and health 
impacts assessment, our extension of the USREP model to include economy-wide air quality co-
benefits, and our application of this new integrated approach to a US national clean energy 
standard and cap–and–trade program.  
Figure 1. Integrated assessment framework for estimating air quality co-benefits of US climate 
policy. This framework first implements policies in the economic model (USREP), then 
estimates the resulting impacts on welfare, production, and emissions. Emissions in SMOKE 
are input to the air quality model CAMx to yield concentrations of fine particulate matter. 
Those concentrations are input to BenMAP to estimate human health impacts. Health impacts 
are input to USREP to estimate the welfare impacts of fine particulate matter pollution.  
2.1 The US Regional Energy Policy Model 
We use USREP to analyze two US-wide carbon policies and to estimate their costs, their 
effects on pollutant emissions, and their respective air quality co-benefits. USREP is a 
multiregion, multicommodity, multihousehold recursive–dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the US economy described in Rausch et al. (2010) and Rausch et al. 
(2011). As a classical Arrow-Debreu model, USREP calculates commodity prices that support 
equilibrium between supply and demand in all markets based on the microeconomic decisions of 
rational agents. By including rich detail in the energy sector, and by relating production to 
emissions of greenhouse gases, USREP is designed to explore the long-run dynamics and the 
economy-wide costs, emissions impacts, and distributional implications of both national and 
subnational energy and climate change policies. USREP has been applied previously to study 
climate change and energy policies, exploring their effects on economic growth, efficiency, 
distribution, and interactions with existing distortionary taxes (Rausch et al., 2010; Rausch et al., 
2011; Caron et al., 2012; Rausch and Mowers, 2013).  
USREP assesses equilibrium conditions over 5-year periods among profit-maximizing firms 
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and utility-maximizing consumers that receive income from supplying four factors of production 
(labor, capital, land, and resources). USREP is a full employment model, with the labor supply 
determined by the household choice between labor and leisure. Taxes are collected by the 
government and spent on consumption and transfers to households (Rausch et al., 2010). 
Table 1. USREP Model Details: Regional, Household, and Sectoral Breakdown and Primary 
Input Factors. 
As shown in Table 1, USREP contains 12 geographic regions, 9 household income groups, 5 
energy commodities, 5 non-energy sectors and advanced “backstop” energy technologies (e.g., 
advanced solar energy is a “backstop” for fossil energy as it can produce a close substitute for this 
non-renewable resource). Production is characterized by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution 
(CES) functions, the details of which are in Rausch et al. (2010). The geographic regions include 
California, Texas, and Florida, and several multistate composites, shown in Figure 2. 
The USREP model is based on 2006 state-level economic data from the Impact analysis for 
PLANning (IMPLAN) data set and energy data from the Energy Information Administration’s 
State Energy Data System (SEDS). The energy supply is regionalized with data on regional 
fossil fuel reserves from the US Geological Service and the Department of Energy. Further 
details are contained in Rausch and Mowers (2013). Several studies examine the effect of 
Sectors Regions Primary Production Factors 
Non-Energy Pacific (PACIF) Capital 
Agriculture (AGR) California (CA) Labor 
Services (SRV) Alaska (AK) Coal resources 
Energy-intensive products (EIS) Mountain (MOUNT) Natural gas resources 
Other industries’ products (OTH) North Central (NCENT) Crude oil resources 
Commercial transportation (TRN) Texas (TX) Hydro resources 
Passenger vehicle transportation (TRN) South Central (SCENT) Nuclear resources 
Final demand sectors Northeast (NEAS) Land 
Household demand Southeast (SEAST) Wind 
Government demand Florida (FL)  
Investment demand New York (NY) Household income classes 
Energy New England (NENGL) ($1,000 of annual income) 
Coal (COL)   <10 
Natural gas (GAS)   10–15 
Crude oil (CRU)   15–25 
Refined oil (OIL)   25–30 
Electric: Fossil (ELE)   30–50 
Electric: Nuclear (NUC)   50–75 
Electric: Hydro (HYD)   75–100 
Advanced Technologies   100–150 
  >150 
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varying model inputs and structure, like the source of household income data (Rausch et al., 
2011), and the structure of the energy system model (Rausch and Mowers, 2013) (Lanz and 
Rausch, 2011). Paltsev and Capros (2014) list numerous studies that have explored the effects on 
climate mitigation costs of assumptions about innovation, low-carbon technologies, flexibility to 
substitute energy to low-carbon options, other regulations and regulatory credibility to trigger 
long-term investment, timing of actions, and the reference scenario. 
Figure 2. The 12 regions of the USREP model. They are the aggregation of the following 
states: NEW ENGLAND = Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island; SOUTHEAST = Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi; NORTHEAST = West Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, District of 
Columbia; SOUTH CENTRAL = Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana; NORTH CENTRAL = 
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa; MOUNTAIN = 
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; PACIFIC = 
Oregon, Washington, Hawaii.  
2.2 Linking USREP to Emissions and Health Outcomes 
Economic activity was linked to emissions, concentrations, and health outcomes by coupling 
USREP to an air quality modeling system and health impacts model. The details of this 
approach, including projected pollutant emissions and concentrations under selected carbon 
policies, are described in full by Thompson et al. (2014a) and summarized below. 
2.2.1 Emissions to Concentrations 
USREP was liked to an air quality modeling system with a national emissions inventory for 
2005. The inventory was speciated and temporally processed using Spare Matrix Operating 
Kernel Emissions (SMOKE) (CMAS, 2010). Emissions inventories for the year 2030 were 
developed by scaling this inventory based on the corresponding economic output from USREP to 
produce gridded, hourly emissions for each scenario. Projected 2030 emissions were used to 
estimate future hourly fine particulate matter concentrations on a 36 km grid of the continental 
US using the Comprehensive Air Quality Model with Extensions (CAMx) version 5.3 (Environ, 
2011). To isolate the effects of policy efforts on the emissions of fine particulate matter and its 
7 
precursors, we did not incorporate climate change in our analysis; emissions are expected to 
exceed the effect of climate change on US fine particulate matter in 2030 (Penrod et al., 2014). 
Instead, meteorological input for the year 2005 was used for both present and future simulations, 
and was developed with the fifth generation Penn State/NCAR mesoscale model MM5 (Grell et 
al., 1994). CAMx has been used in numerous evaluations of US air quality policy (US EPA, 
2011; US EPA, 2012). The year-long air quality modeling episode for 2005 that we use as our 
base year was developed as part of a base case to evaluate the proposed Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule, which was documented and evaluated in US EPA (2011). 
2.2.2 Concentrations to Health Outcomes 
We calculate mortality and morbidity resulting from fine particulate matter concentrations 
using the Environmental Benefits Mapping and Analysis (BenMAP) program, v4.0. Previous 
studies using this air pollution episode analyzed benefits of both ozone and fine particulate 
matter due to mortality reductions alone (Thompson et al., 2014a; Thompson et al., 2014b). 
Here, we focus on fine particulate matter, estimating both morbidity and mortality following the 
methods used in the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for the fine particulate matter National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard (US EPA, 2012). Following the RIA’s approach, we have 
estimated the lower and upper bound of the number of health impacts based on both the selection 
of health impact functions, and the uncertainty in those functions, as specified in Table 2.   
2.3 Economic Modeling of Air Quality Co-Benefits 
For this study, we incorporate the economic and welfare effects of pollution-related health 
outcomes into USREP, accounting for morbidities and mortalities with separate techniques. Our 
focus is on the change in consumer welfare, which can be generally understood as the income 
amount that would be necessary to compensate consumers for losses under a policy. Our welfare 
index includes the change in macroeconomic consumption (capturing market-based activities), 
and the change in leisure (i.e. the monetary value of the change in non-working time) in response 
to policy (Paltsev and Copros, 2014). We account for morbidities through lost wages, lost 
leisure, and medical expenses that vary with pollution levels. We account for mortality by 
reducing the supply of labor accordingly. 
2.3.1 Morbidities in USREP 
We account for morbidities related to fine particulate matter by representing the change in 
medical expenditures and lost wages through a new sector added to USREP. We add a household 
production sector for “pollution health services” whose production is determined by the pollution 
level and the valuation of the resulting health outcomes. The valuation of each morbidity 
endpoint is shown in Table 2, following US EPA (2012). These valuations are derived from 
estimates of willingness-to-pay (i.e. for asthma exacerbation and upper respiratory symptoms), 
medical costs, and lost wages, using US data. Similar approaches incorporate willingness-to-pay 
in CGE models to estimate air quality impacts, representing non-market losses as lost leisure  
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Table 2. Endpoints, epidemiologic studies, and valuations used for fine particulate matter health 
impacts, following US EPA (2012). 
 
Endpoint/Endpoint Group Ages 
(yrs) 
Individual Studies Pooling and 
Lower/Upper bounds 
Valuation 
2006 US$ 
Premature Mortality 
  
>30  Krewski et al. (2009) and Lepeule 
et al. (2012) 
Upper bound: Lepeule 
(2012) 95th percentile  
Lower bound: Krewski 
et al. (2009) 5th percentile 
N/A 
Nonfatal Myocardial 
Infarction 
  Peters et al. (2001).  
Pope et al. (2006), Sullivan et al. 
(2005), Zanobetti et al. (2009), 
Zanobetti and Schwartz (2006) 
Upper bound: Peters et 
al. (2001) 95th percentile  
Lower bound: 5th 
percentile of equal-
weights pooling of 4 
other studies 
$100,000  
Respiratory 
Hospital 
Admissions 
All >64  Zanobetti et al. (2009)—ICD 460–
519 (All respiratory) 
Kloog et al. (2012)—ICD 460–519 
(All respiratory)  
Pooling of: 
All Respiratory: 
Pooling of Zanobetti et 
al. (2009) and Kloog et 
al. (2012)  
Asthma: Pooling Babin 
et al. (2007) and 
Sheppard (2003)  
COPD (less asthma): 
Moolgavkar (2000)  
$23,711  
COPD 18–64 Moolgavkar (2000)—ICD 490–492, 
494–496 (COPD, less asthma) 
$15,903  
Asthma <18  Babin et al. (2007)—ICD 493 
(asthma), Sheppard (2003)—ICD 
493 (asthma) 
$10,040  
Cardiovascular Hospital 
Admissions 
>64  Zanobetti et al. (2009)—ICD 390–
459 (all cardiovascular) 
Peng et al. (2009)—ICD 426–427; 
428; 430–438; 410–414; 429; 
440–449 (Cardio-, cerebro- and 
peripheral vascular disease) 
Peng et al. (2008)—ICD 426–427; 
428; 430–438; 410–414; 429; 
440–449 (Cardio-, cerebro- and 
peripheral vascular disease) 
Bell et al. (2008)—ICD 426–427; 
428; 430–438; 410–414; 429; 
440–449 (Cardio-, cerebro- and 
peripheral vascular disease) 
Pooling of all 4 studies 
for ages > 64 added to 
Moolgavkar (2000) for 
ages 18–64 
$27,319  
18–64  Moolgavkar (2000)—ICD 390–429 
(all cardiovascular) 
$29,364  
Asthma-related ER Visits <18 Mar et al. (2010), Slaughter et al. 
(2005), Glad et al. (2012) 
Pooling of all 3 studies $370  
Acute bronchitis 8–12 Dockery et al. (1996) N/A $416  
Lower Respiratory 
Symptoms 
7–14 Schwartz and Neas (2000) N/A $18  
Upper Respiratory 
Symptoms 
9–11 Pope et al. (1991) N/A $29  
Asthma Exacerbation 6–18  Ostro et al. (2001) (cough, 
wheeze, shortness of breath), Mar 
et al. (2004) (cough, shortness of 
breath) 
Pooling of Ostro et al. 
(2001) and Mar et al. 
(2004) 
$50  
Minor Restricted-Activity 
Days  
18–64 Ostro and Rothschild (1989) N/A $60  
Work Loss Days 18–64 Ostro (1987) N/A $150  
ER = Emergency Room 
ICD = International Statistical Classification of Disease 
COPD = Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
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(Matus et al., 2008; Selin et al., 2009; Nam et al., 2010; Matus et al., 2012). Smith and Carbone 
(2007) discuss the theoretically preferred approach and remaining empirical challenges to 
incorporating air quality preferences in CGE models. We follow US EPA (2012) as these 
valuations have been applied in evaluating US air quality regulations (US EPA, 2012) (US EPA, 
2011). Within USREP, we apply the valuation per case to the number of cases estimated using 
BenMAP, and use the total valuation to calculate the demand for resources for the new 
“pollution health services” sector. 
The “pollution health services” sector tracks the demand for economic resources in response 
to pollution-related health outcomes. Higher pollution reduces welfare by requiring more 
resources per health outcome. Each outcome creates economic impacts comprised of medical 
costs, lost labor, and other disutility (e.g., pain and suffering). We map these impacts to demand 
for sectoral inputs of services and labor using functions for each endpoint developed by Yang 
(2004) and Matus et al. (2008). The fine particulate matter pollution levels affect the output of 
the pollution health services sector, with higher pollution drawing more resources per unit of 
output (termed a Hicks neutral negative technical change). Policies that reduce pollution increase 
welfare as lower pollution increases the productivity of this sector.  
We add this new sector to those listed in Table 1, following Matus et al. (2008) and Nam et 
al. (2010). It requires inputs of service, which are drawn from the services (“SRV”) sector, and 
of labor, which are drawn from the household labor supply. The output of this new sector is 
included in private consumption. It thus forms a component of household welfare, i.e. the sum of 
consumption and leisure. 
2.3.2 Mortalities in USREP 
We do not value pollution-related mortalities directly (e.g., with a VSL estimate), but instead 
estimate how they affect welfare by reducing the supply of labor. Higher pollution-related 
mortality reduces welfare in a region by reducing the supply of labor. We first estimate the 
change in the adult (>30 years) population by dynamically reducing the census-based population 
projections in USREP by the amount of pollution-related mortalities from BenMAP. We apply a 
2/3 labor participation rate of adults (i.e. the employment-to-population ratio) to estimate the 
percent change in the labor force from the percent change in population, as in Matus et al. 
(2008). We apply the change in labor force to the year in which the death took place, effectively 
accounting for one year of life lost per death. Estimating the actual years of life lost would 
increase our estimates of the labor impact of mortality. By reducing the labor supply, we affect 
wage rates, which in turn affect workers’ decisions on how to use their total time endowment, 
represented in USREP as a substitution between labor and leisure (Rausch et al., 2010). 
2.4 Climate Change Policies 
2.4.1 Clean Energy Standard and Equivalent Cap and Trade Program 
We apply our modeling framework to estimate economy-wide co-benefits from fine 
particulate matter reductions under two national climate policies, previously implemented in 
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USREP (Rausch and Mowers, 2013). These policies’ air quality implications and estimated co-
benefits were previously assessed by applying VSL measures to mortalities from fine particulate 
matter and ozone (Thompson et al., 2014a).  
Our first policy is a clean energy standard (CES) similar to the proposed clean energy 
standard Act of 2012 (Bingman et al., 2012). This policy doubles clean energy from 42% to 80% 
by 2035, beginning in 2012, by setting specified percentages of electricity sales from qualified 
energy sources. The second policy is an equivalent US economy-wide cap–and–trade policy 
(CAT). The revenue from auctioned emissions permits for the CAT is returned lump-sum to 
households on a per capita basis (Rausch and Mowers, 2013). Both policies reduce equivalent 
CO2 emissions, i.e. 500 million metric tons CO2, or a 10% reduction in 2030 relative to 2006 
emissions. Both the CAT and CES are compared to a Business As Usual (BAU) scenario in 
which CO2 emissions grow to 6,200 mmt by 2030. We analyze these policies as they were 
implemented in USREP by Thompson et al. (2014a). We estimate the costs of each policy as the 
cumulative, undiscounted change in welfare (i.e. material consumption and leisure) for all 
regions from 2006–2030 compared to BAU. 
2.4.2 Estimating Welfare Impacts of Policies from Fine Particulate Matter Reductions over 
Time 
To estimate co-benefits from fine particulate matter reductions, we first average our CAMx 
output to the temporal and spatial scales of USREP. From CAMx we obtain daily concentrations 
in 2005, as well as in 2030 for our BAU, CAT, and CES scenarios. We combine those 
concentrations with census data to obtain population-weighted annual average concentrations for 
each USREP region contained in our air quality modeling grid. Because we model air quality in 
the continental US only, we do not estimate co-benefits for Alaska and Hawaii.  
To capture cumulative impacts as reductions are gradually realized, we interpolate pollution 
reductions between 2005 and 2030 and their health effects over our analysis period of 2006–2030. For 
morbidities, that pollution change (in every 5-year period and region) becomes the (Hicks neutral) 
negative scaling factor that affects the productivity of the health services sector. Under BAU, we 
assume population-weighted pollution levels follow a linear progression from 2006 to 2030 levels. 
Our policies begin implementation in 2012. We assume pollution levels follow BAU from 2006–
2012, and then assume a linear implementation of the remaining reductions from 2012–2030 for each 
policy. For mortalities, we estimate total deaths from the change in fine particulate matter between 
2006 and 2030 in BenMAP for BAU and both policies. We then follow the same interpolation process 
for mortalities as for the pollution levels to allocate those deaths over the periods in BenMAP between 
2006 and 2030. Over time, increases in labor productivity and population size and age each serve to 
increase the value of a policy’s pollution reductions compared to BAU.  
To estimate economy-wide co-benefits, we run USREP six more times from 2006–2030. We 
run USREP twice for each of the three scenarios, BAU, CES, and CAT, using the corresponding 
pollution levels and the lower and upper bounds of the health effects estimates, respectively. The 
upper and lower bounds are determined following US EPA (2012), and are based on the 95% 
confidence intervals of individual or pooled studies in combination with the selection of different 
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studies to assess the lower and upper bounds of outcomes for each endpoint. We estimate the co-
benefits of each policy as the cumulative, undiscounted change in welfare (i.e. material 
consumption and leisure) compared to BAU. This change in welfare is our estimate of each 
policy’s air quality co-benefit. 
2.5 Integrated Assessment Process: Policy Costs to Air Quality Co-Benefits in one 
Framework 
To summarize this process, depicted in Figure 1, results from USREP are used to estimate the 
policy costs and economic activity under BAU, CAT, and CES, respectively. Those economic 
activities were mapped to emissions of particulate matter and its precursors in 2030 by scaling a 
detailed emissions inventory for 2005 in SMOKE, and fine particulate matter concentrations in 
2005 and 2030 estimated by CAMx (Thompson et al., 2014a). Based on these previous results, 
we create upper and lower bound estimates of morbidities and mortalities over time with 
BenMAP. We then run USREP again to estimate the lower and upper bounds of air quality 
welfare impacts for each of BAU, CES, and CAT. Thus, we use the economy-wide impacts of 
complying with each policy to model future pollutant concentrations and their economy-wide 
impacts due to human health responses. We estimate net co-benefits by subtracting air quality 
co-benefits from the policy cost. 
3. RESULTS: CO-BENEFITS FROM FINE PARTICULATE MATTER REDUCTIONS 
We present estimates of air quality co-benefits for each policy, on a total, per capita, and per 
ton of CO2 basis. We then sum the welfare impacts of pollution and policy implementation to 
calculate net co-benefits. We compare co-benefits to costs to estimate the fraction by which co-
benefits reduce policy costs. We present results at the national scale followed by the regional 
scale. Finally, we explore how general equilibrium and cumulative effects contribute to our 
results, both in terms of policy efficiency (i.e. net co-benefits) and distributional implications.  
3.1 National Air Quality Co-Benefits and Net Co-Benefits by Policy 
3.1.1 National Co-Benefits 
Co-benefits from fine particulate matter reduction for each policy compared to BAU are 
presented in Table 3. We show the median and the upper and lower bounds derived from the 
uncertainty in the health estimates, as in Table 2. All values are denominated in constant year 
2005 US$ (i.e. 2005$). Nationally, we estimate that the CES yields higher co-benefits ($13 
billion, with a range $4 to $21 billion) than the CAT program ($9 billion, range $3 to $15 
billion), measured as cumulative benefits by 2030 in 2005$. This reflects the greater fine 
particulate matter reductions under the CES than under the CAT (reduction in population-
weighted annual average daily mean of 0.97 µg·m-3 for CES, compared to 0.56 µg·m-3 for CAT) 
(Thompson et al., 2014a). These co-benefits correspond to $8 ($3 to $14)/tCO2 for the CES, and 
$6 ($2 to $10)/tCO2 for the CAT. 
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3.1.2 National Net Co-Benefits 
We compare the air quality co-benefits of each policy to its respective cost, reported as the 
cumulative, undiscounted change in welfare (i.e. material consumption and leisure) compared to 
BAU, shown in Table 4. We calculate net co-benefits as the sum of the modeled welfare changes 
due to fine particulate matter reductions (always positive) and due to policy implementation 
(usually negative). Co-benefits are the change in welfare from fine particulate matter changes. 
Policy costs are the change in welfare from policy implementation; policies can impart welfare 
gains to some regions, which we term a “positive cost.” Positive net co-benefits indicate a net 
welfare gain when air quality co-benefits are included in policy costs. The CES is the more 
Table 3. Median co-benefits of each policy (total, per capita, and per ton of mitigated CO2 
emissions) [range in square brackets]. The CES has higher co-benefits than the CAT, nationally 
and across regions. Co-benefits from fine particulate matter reductions by each policy are 
expressed in terms of: (1) the cumulative, undiscounted change in welfare (i.e. material 
consumption and leisure) compared to BAU from 2006–2030 (million 2005$); (2) the equivalent 
welfare change per capita (2005$); (3) the welfare change per ton of CO2 mitigated. The 
median appears along with the range estimated from the uncertainty in health estimates in 
square brackets. Negative values are in round brackets. West and East are divided by the 
Mississippi River, and their values are the sums of their respective regions. 
Region 
Co-Benefits (Million 2005$) Co-Benefits Per Capita (2005$) 
Co-Benefits Per Ton of CO2 
Mitigated ($2005/tCO2) 
CES CAT CES CAT CES CAT 
National $12,800 [$4,500, $21,000] 
$8,700 
[$2,800, $14,600] 
$35 
[$12, $57] 
$24 
[$8, $40] 
$8 
[$3, $14] 
$6 
[$2, $10] 
West $2,800 [$900, $4,600] 
$2,500 
[$630, $4,370] 
$100 
[$40, $150] 
$81 
[$22, $140] 
$4.1 
[$1.2, $7.0] 
$29 
[$7, $51] 
East $10,000 [$3,500, $17,000] 
$6,200 
[$2,200, $10,200] 
$260 
[$90, $430] 
$190 
[$70, $320] 
$140 
[$40, $240] 
$40 
[$10, $60] 
Pacific $81 [$81, $81] 
$55 
[$19, $90] 
$5 
[$5, $5] 
$4 
[$1, $6] 
$1 
[$1, $1] 
$4 
[$1, $6] 
California $270 [$80, $450] 
$440 
[$70, $810] 
$6 
[$2, $10] 
$9 
[$2, $17] 
$4 
[$1, $6] 
$10 
[$2, $19] 
Mountain $200 [$60, $340] 
$260 
[$40, $490] 
$7 
[$2, $11] 
$9 
[$1, $16] 
$1 
[$0, $2] 
$1.5 
[$0.2, $2.7] 
North 
Central 
$980 
[$400, $1,600] 
$460 
[$190, $730] 
$45 
[$18, $71] 
$21 
[$9, $33] 
$6* 
[$2, $9] 
$4 
[$1, $6] 
Texas $1,100 [$300, $1,800] 
$1,280 
[$310, $2,250] 
$32 
[$10, $55] 
$38 
[$9, $68] 
$4 
[$1, $7] 
$10 
[$2, $18] 
Northeast $3,900 [$1,400, $6,400] 
$2,200 
[$800, $3,500] 
$48 
[$17, $79] 
$26 
[$9, $44] 
$11 
[$4, $19] 
$9 
[$3, $14] 
New 
England 
$560 
[$140, $980] 
$1,000 
[$400, $1,700] 
$36 
[$9, $63] 
$66 
[$24, $109] 
$98 
[$24, $170] 
$7 
[$2, $11] 
New York $680 [$240, $1,100] 
$660 
[$260, $1,050] 
$35 
[$12, $58] 
$34 
[$13, $54] 
$10 
[$3, $16] 
$7 
[$3, $11] 
South 
Central 
$660 
[$290, $1,000] 
$280 
[$100, $470] 
$55 
[$24, $87] 
$24 
[$8, $39] 
$6 
[$2, $9] 
$3 
[$1, $5] 
Southeast $3,400 [$1,100, $5,600] 
$1,700 
[$600, $2,700] 
$57 
[$19, $95] 
$28 
[$10, $46] 
$8 
[$3, $14] 
$7 
[$3, $12] 
Florida $840 [$340, $1,300] 
$440 
[$120, $750] 
$29 
[$12, $47] 
$15 
[$4, $26] 
$7 
[$3, $12] 
$2 
[$1, $4] 
*In the North Central region, CO2 emissions actually rise slightly (by 5%) under the CES due to increased coal 
and gas use in the electricity sector. 
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expensive policy, costing $242 billion (2005$) compared to $8 billion (2005$) for a CAT that 
reduces the same amount of CO2.  
We compare co-benefits to policy costs in two ways. We sum co-benefits and policy costs to 
estimate net co-benefits. Summing co-benefits and costs estimates the amount by which air quality 
impacts reduce the apparent mitigation costs. If net co-benefits are positive, then fine particulate 
matter co-benefits completely offset policy costs. Each policy has different costs and co-benefits 
Table 4. Co-benefits, costs, and net co-benefits in billions 2005$. The CAT is more cost-effective 
than the CES, and its co-benefits can offset more of its costs, up to 190% (median 110%; 40% 
to 190%). (1) Co-benefits of each policy are the change in welfare (consumption and leisure) 
from BAU due to fine particulate matter reductions, expressed in billions 2005$. (2) Costs of 
each policy are the change (usually a negative change) in welfare (consumption and leisure) 
from BAU due to the policy implementation, expressed in billions 2005$. Regions that gain from 
policy implementation (i.e. costs are positive) are highlighted with double outlines. (3) Net co-
benefits are the sum of these two welfare changes. Where net co-benefits are positive, cells are 
emphasized with double outlines. The median appears along with the range estimated from the 
uncertainty in health estimates. Negative values are in round brackets. West and East are 
divided by the Mississippi River, and their values are the sums of their respective regions. 
Region 
Co-Benefit (billion 2005$) Cost (billion 2005$) Net Co-Benefit (billion 2005$) 
CES CAT CES CAT CES CAT 
National $13 [$5, $21] 
$9 
[$3, $15] ($242) ($8) 
($229) 
[($237), ($221)] 
$1 
[($5), $7] 
West $2.8 [$0.9, $4.6] 
$3 
[$0.6, $4] ($92) ($8.2) 
($89) 
[($91), ($87)] 
($5.7) 
[($7.6), ($3.8)] 
East $10 [$3.5, $16.5] 
$6 
[$2, $10] ($150) $0.4 
($140) 
[($146), ($133)] 
$6.7 
[$2.7, $10.7] 
Pacific $0.25 [$0.08, $0.41] 
$0.05 
[$0.02, $0.09] $3.2 $0.5 
$3 
[$3, $4] 
$0.6 
[$0.5, $0.6] 
California $0.26 [$0.08, $0.45] 
$0.44 
[$0.07, $0.09] ($25) $1.4 
($24) 
[($25), ($24)] 
$1.8 
[$1.4, $2.2] 
Mountain $0.20 [$0.06, $0.34] 
$0.26 
[$0.04, $0.49] ($17) ($2.5) 
($17) 
[($17), ($17)] 
($2.2) 
[($2.4), ($2.0)] 
North 
Central 
$0.98 
[$0.40, $1.6] 
$0.46 
[$0.19, $0.73] ($22) ($2.2) 
($21) 
[($21), ($20)] 
($1.7) 
[($2.0), ($1.5)] 
Texas $1.1 [$0.3, $1.8] 
$1.28 
[$0.31, $2.25] ($31) ($5.4) 
($30) 
[($31), ($29)] 
($4.1) 
[($5.1), ($3.2)] 
Northeast $3.9 [$1.4, $6.4] 
$2.2 
[$0.8, $3.5] ($60) ($1.5) 
($56) 
[($59), ($54)] 
$0.7 
[($0.7), $2.1] 
New 
England 
$0.6 
[$0.1, $1.0] 
$1.0 
[$0.4, $1.7] ($6.5) $2.5 
($6.0) 
[($6.4), ($5.6)] 
$3.5 
[$2.8, $4.2] 
New York $0.7 [$0.2, $1.1] 
$0.7 
[$0.3, $1.1] ($6.9) $0.3 
($6.2) 
[($6.7), ($5.8)] 
$1.0 
[$0.6, $1.4] 
South 
Central 
$0.7 
[$0.3, $1.0] 
$0.28 
[$0.10, $0.47] ($13) ($1.4) 
($12) 
[($13), ($12)] 
($1.1) 
[($1.3), ($0.9)] 
Southeast $3.4 [$1.1, $5.6] 
$1.7 
[$0.6, $2.7] ($37) $0.2 
($34) 
[($36), ($32)] 
$1.9 
[$0.8, $3.0] 
Florida $0.8 [$0.3, $1.3] 
$0.4 
[$0.1, $0.7] ($26) $0.3 
($25) 
[($26), ($25)] 
$0.7 
[$0.4, $1.1] 
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(e.g., the CES has higher co-benefits and higher costs). Thus, to indicate the relative importance of 
air quality, we estimate what fraction of policy costs are offset by air quality co-benefits. 
We find that the CES has net co-benefits of -$230 (-$237 to -$221) billion 2005$. The CAT 
has net co-benefits of $1 (-$5 to $7) billion 2005$. This implies that the policy costs of the CES 
are reduced by 5% (2% to 9%) by ancillary fine particulate matter reductions. For the CAT, up to 
190% of the costs are offset by co-benefits (median 110%; 40% to 190%). 
3.2 Regional Air Quality Co-Benefits and Net Co-Benefits by Policy 
3.2.1 Regional Co-Benefits 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the calculated co-benefits of each policy across the 
continental US (total, per capita, and per ton of mitigated CO2 emissions). Most co-benefits go to 
regions east of the Mississippi River. For the CES, per capita gains are $260 in 2005$ in the East 
compared to $95 in the West, with 78% of all gains accruing to eastern regions. For the CAT, 
71% of all gains accrue to the East. The distribution of co-benefits is a combination of the pattern 
of pollution reductions and general equilibrium (GE) economic effects. Because fine particulate 
matter reductions are greatest in the eastern states under both policies (Thompson et al., 2014a), 
most co-benefits accrue to those regions. We discuss GE effects in a later results section on the 
Contribution of General Equilibrium Economic Effects.  
Some regions experience high or low co-benefits on a per ton basis. This pattern is the 
distributional effect of a national policy. To understand the effects of a regional policy, a 
separate analysis would be required. For example, under the CES, in one region—North 
Central—CO2 emissions actually rise by 5%. Thus, the co-benefits per ton of CO2 in North 
Central (median $6/tCO2; range $2/tCO2 to $9/tCO2 2005$) are actually expressed with respect 
to an increase in CO2 emissions. CO2 emissions rise under the CES in North Central due to 
increased coal and gas use in the electricity sector. This outcome is only possible because 
compliance with the CES is counted on a national basis and not for each region; if each region 
had to meet the clean energy standard on its own, this effect would not occur. Similarly, New 
England only reduces a small amount of CO2 under the CES, as more cost-effective reductions 
are realized elsewhere. At the same time, New England still benefits from upwind pollutant 
reductions, and, consequently, appears to have high benefits per ton of $98/tCO2 ($24/tCO2 to 
$170/tCO2). As with North Central, if New England had to meet a regional CES of its own, its 
co-benefits per ton would likely drop as its required CO2 reductions would rise. If New England 
unilaterally adopted a CES, its local pollutant emissions might decrease, but its transport of 
pollution from unconstrained upwind regions might rise compared to a national CES. Given 
these interregional interactions, the costs and co-benefits in a given region do not depend only on 
the local impacts of policy or pollution.   
3.2.2 Regional Net Air Quality Co-Benefits 
Table 4 displays the co-benefits, the costs, and the net co-benefits by policy and region. The 
costs are defined as the cumulative change in welfare (consumption and leisure) resulting from 
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compliance with each policy, expressed in billion 2005$. Since “costs” are defined as a welfare 
change (usually negative), the regions that benefit from implementing these policies have a positive 
“cost”. Those regions are highlighted in Table 4. Net co-benefits are the sum of the welfare changes 
due to fine particulate matter reductions (always positive) and due to policy implementation (usually 
negative). Regions with positive net co-benefits are also highlighted in Table 4.  
Implementing each policy does benefit some regions, i.e. their policy “costs” are actually a 
welfare gain. For the CAT, this is true in the East, which gains $0.4 billion. Regions that gain from 
the CAT are the coastal regions except for the Northeast, i.e. Pacific, California, New England, 
New York, Southeast, and Florida. As explained in Rausch and Mowers (2013), coastal regions 
appear to gain from the CAT because of how we treat its revenue, which we return to households 
on a per capita basis. Our per capita allocation of carbon revenue over-compensates people in these 
populous, largely decarbonized areas (Rausch and Mowers, 2013). For the CES, it is only the 
Pacific region that gains a relative advantage and reaps $0.5 billion 2005$ relative to BAU.  
In terms of net co-benefits, the CAT favors the East while the CES favors the West. For the 
CAT, the East nets a gain of $6.7 ($2.7 to $11) billion 2005$. The West posts a net loss of -$5.7 
(-$7.6 to -$3.8) billion 2005$. For the CES, the East and West post net losses of $140 ($133 to 
$146) and $89 ($87 to $91) billion 2005$, respectively. Under the CES, the East fares worse than 
West because its higher co-benefits ($10 billion in the East versus $3 billion in the West) are 
countered by even higher costs (-$150 billion in the East versus -$92 billion in the West).  
For each policy, some regions receive a net gain. For the CAT, net co-benefits are positive in 
the coastal regions (which gain from policy implementation, i.e. have positive costs), including 
the Northeast (where costs are negative). Median net co-benefits in these regions range from $0.7 
billion 2005$ in the Northeast to $3.5 billion 2005$ in New England. For the CES, median net 
co-benefits are positive only in the Pacific, at $0.4 billion 2005$. Apart from the Northeast, the 
regions with positive net co-benefits are the regions that gain under their respective policy 
implementations, i.e. the regions with positive costs. Thus, the Northeast under the CAT is the 
one instance where positive co-benefits (median $2.2; $0.8 to $3.5 billion 2005$) offset the 
negative costs of implementation (-$1.5 billion 2005$).   
We compare co-benefits of the CES to the magnitude of its policy costs (whether negative or 
positive) in Figure 3. Everywhere, the welfare impact of implementing a CES is greater than that 
of the resulting reduction in fine particulate matter. Median CES co-benefits range from 1% (in 
California) to 10% (in New York) of the magnitude of policy costs. This pattern combines the 
relative importance of both co-benefits and costs. For example, the Pacific region has a ratio of 
8% because its costs are less than in the California and Mountain regions, which have similar co-
benefits (co-benefits are Pacific: $0.25, California: $0.26, Mountain: $0.20 billion 2005$), and 
ratios of 1%. New York and New England similarly reach ratios of 10% and 9% by having the 
3rd and 2nd lowest costs. Conversely, the Southeast has a high ratio compared to other regions 
because it has the highest co-benefits ($3.4 billion 2005$). 
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Figure 3. Ratio of median co-benefits to the magnitude of policy costs for the CES (%). Median 
CES co-benefits range from 1% (in California) to 10% (in New York) of the magnitude of 
policy costs.  
Figure 4. Ratio of median co-benefits to the magnitude of policy costs for the CAT (%). The 
relative welfare impact of pollution to policy implementation is greatest in the East, where 
co-benefits are 14 times greater than costs. Median values are plotted; for the CAT these 
range from 11% to 690%, and are >100% for Florida, New York, Northeast, and Southeast.  
Figure 4 shows the ratios of co-benefits to the magnitude of costs for the CAT, which range 
from 11% to 690%. Co-benefits exceed the magnitude of policy costs in the East, and in four 
eastern regions. In the West, they are 0.3 times smaller overall, and range from 11% of costs (in 
Pacific and Mountain) to 32% in the North Central region. Co-benefits from pollution reduction 
in the East are 14 times the welfare impact of compliance. Co-benefits are greater than the 
magnitude of the cost in Florida, the Northeast, New York, and Southeast by a factor of 1.4, 1.4, 
1.9, and 6.9, respectively.  
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3.3 Contribution of General Equilibrium Economic Effects 
3.3.1 National Co-Benefits: Contribution of Cumulative and Indirect Effects 
In addition to estimating direct morbidity costs, this approach represents cumulative and indirect 
welfare gains as fine particulate matter is gradually reduced compared to BAU under each policy. 
Over the entire 2006–2030 period, the direct effects of morbidities are 9% and 7% of the total co-
benefits for the CES and CAT. The remaining 91% and 93% of welfare impacts are the effects of 
price adjustments and labor productivity (from avoided mortality) that compound over time as they 
are applied to successively larger populations. This compounding of co-benefits from years prior to 
2030 amounts to 42% and 45% of cumulative co-benefits for the CES and CAT, respectively.  
3.3.2 Regional Co-Benefits: Patterns of Direct and Indirect Effects 
We compare our distribution of co-benefits to one that values mortalities directly. This 
comparison illustrates how our approach yields a different regional pattern of co-benefits than 
would be found using a typical VSL approach. VSL valuations of avoided mortality comprise the 
majority of fine particulate matter benefits in impact assessments that use them. For example, the 
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA, 2013) 
cited air quality regulations as having the greatest benefits of all regulations reviewed, and those 
regulations have > 90% of benefits due to VSL valuations of fine particulate matter related 
mortality (e.g., US EPA, 2012). Thus, the distributional implications of air quality benefits 
evaluated this way will have a pattern that largely follows the pattern of avoided mortality. Here 
we represent mortality as a labor impact, and we also account for the indirect effects of market 
interactions. Therefore, we expect our distribution of co-benefits to differ from our distribution 
of avoided mortalities. We explore that difference for each policy.  
Under policy, each region avoids a certain number of mortalities, which is a percentage of the 
total avoided mortalities. Similarly, each region gains a particular share of our estimated co-
benefits. Here, we explore the difference in the regional patterns of co-benefits and avoided 
mortalities by calculating the percentage by which the share of co-benefits differs from the share 
of avoided mortalities.  
If the effect of mortality on welfare were identical in each region, then the difference in these 
patterns should be zero everywhere. Positive differences would mean that the co-benefits we 
calculate would be underestimated using one VSL for all regions, while negative values mean 
they would be overestimated.  
Morbidities could explain small differences between the shares of co-benefits and mortalities by 
region. The direct costs of morbidities contribute less than 9% to co-benefits for either policy, and 
are highly spatially correlated with avoided mortalities (97% correlation of avoided morbidities 
and mortalities by region). Thus, we attribute differences of 10% or more in the share of co-
benefits and avoided deaths to differences in the welfare impact of mortality by region, which can 
arise through differences in relative labor productivity and abundance, and the effects of trade. 
For the CES, the distribution of co-benefits differs from the distribution of mortalities by as 
much as -25% in California to 25% in New York. Figure 5 shows the percent difference in the 
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share of median co-benefits from the share of median mortalities, cumulative from 2006‒2030. 
We find, for example, that New York has 4% of all mortalities avoided by the CES, but reaps 5% 
of the total welfare gain. Thus, the welfare gain from avoided mortalities in New York is greater 
than in other regions for the CES. The pattern of mortalities is a good predictor of co-benefits, 
explaining 99% of the variance in co-benefits between regions. However, if we were to apply the 
national average welfare gain from avoided mortalities to New York, we would underestimate its 
co-benefits by $132 million 2005$. Conversely, we would overestimate co-benefits in Texas by 
$138 million 2005$.   
Figure 5. Median difference in the share of co-benefits from the share of mortalities (%). For the 
CES, each region’s share of co-benefits is different than its share of avoided mortalities. 
Compared to valuing mortality directly with VSL, this approach gives a distributional pattern 
of co-benefits that differs by as much as -25% in California to 25% in New York.  
Figure 6. Median difference in the share of co-benefits from the share of mortalities (%). For 
seven regions, the pattern of the share of co-benefits matches that of mortalities within 
10%. Using one valuation for mortality risk in all regions would overestimate co-benefits in 
every region except North Central, New York, and New England, and would differ in the 
share of co-benefits by as much as -15% in California to 27% in New England.  
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For the CAT, the distribution of co-benefits agrees with the distribution of avoided mortalities 
within 10% for seven regions, as shown in Figure 6. Using one valuation for mortality risk in all 
regions would explain over 98% of the variance in co-benefits between regions. It would, 
however, overestimate co-benefits in every region except North Central, New York, and New 
England, and would differ in the share of co-benefits by as much as -15% in South Central to 
27% in New England. Using the average welfare gain from avoided mortalities would 
underestimate co-benefits in New York and New England by $100 million 2005$ and $220 
million 2005$, respectively.  
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We present a self-consistent integrated modeling framework to quantify the economy-wide 
co-benefits of fine particulate matter reductions under climate change and energy policy in the 
US. We employ a US economic model previously linked to an air quality modeling system, and 
enhance it to represent the economy-wide welfare impacts of fine particulate matter. We present 
a first application of this method to explore the efficiency and distributional implications of a 
clean energy standard and a cap–and–trade program that both reduce CO2 emissions by 10% in 
2030 relative to 2006, including their ancillary impacts on fine particulate matter.  
Based on our consistent methodological treatment of both climate policy costs and the co-
benefits of air pollution reductions, we find that avoided damages from fine particulate matter 
alone can completely offset the costs of reducing CO2 through cap–and–trade in the US. Up to 
190% (median 110%; 40% to 190%) of the CAT’s policy cost are offset by co-benefits of $6 ($2 
to $10)/tCO2 for the CAT. In the process of reducing CO2 emissions by 10%, the CAT reduces 
fine particulate matter concentrations by 0.56 µg·m-3 in 2030 relative to 2006, yielding health-
related economic benefits that offset the cumulative welfare impact of the CAT to yield a net 
impact of $1 (-$5 to $7) billion 2005$.   
Though the equivalent clean energy standard yields higher pollution reductions (0.97 µg·m-3, 
population weighted annual average reduction in 2030 versus 2005), the corresponding co-
benefit (median $8; $3 to $14)/tCO2 is a smaller fraction (median 5%; 2% to 9%) of its higher 
policy costs. A less cost-effective means of reducing CO2 than the CAT, the CES has a net 
welfare impact (co-benefits minus costs) of -$229 (-$237 to -$221) billion 2005$. 
Including air quality co-benefits affects not only the efficiency but the distributional 
implications of each policy. The distributional pattern of co-benefits favors the East for both 
policies, which garners 78% and 71% of gains for the CES and CAT, respectively. On a net co-
benefits basis, the CAT favors the East while the CES favors the West. The only area with a net 
gain under either policy is the East, which nets a gain of $6.7 ($2.7 to $10.7) billion 2005$ under 
the CAT. In several regions in the East under the CAT, the impacts of air quality are greater than 
the impacts of the policy by a factor of 1.4, 1.4, 1.9, and 6.9 for Florida, Northeast, New York, 
and Southeast, respectively. Overall, co-benefits from pollution reductions in the East are 14 
times the welfare impact of compliance with the CAT. 
General equilibrium effects shift our distributional implications compared to a traditional 
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analysis that values mortalities directly. Over 90% of our co-benefits arise from a combination of 
labor and price adjustments as they compound over time, i.e. a combination of the direct labor 
effects of mortalities with general equilibrium effects. For both policies, avoided mortalities are a 
good predictor of the co-benefits within a region, but the welfare impact of a healthier labor 
force differs across regions. General equilibrium effects and interregional differences in labor 
productivity and supply shift the distribution of our co-benefits compared to the pattern of 
avoided mortalities. For the CES, the patterns of co-benefits and mortality differ by as much as  
-25% in California to 25% in New York. For the CAT, the distribution of co-benefits agrees with 
the distribution of mortalities within 10% for seven regions. However, using a single value for 
the welfare impact of mortality would overestimate co-benefits in most regions excepting New 
York and New England, where co-benefits would be understated by $100 million 2005$ and 
$220 million 2005$, respectively. 
We track the economy-wide effect of mortality related to pollution as a reduction in the 
supply of labor, which yields lower benefits compared to studies that value mortality directly 
using VSL. Per ton of CO2 emissions avoided, our co-benefits of $6 ($2 to $10)/tCO2 for the 
CAT and $8 ($3 to $14)/tCO2 for the CES are lower than previous work by Thompson et al. 
(2014a) and reviewed by Nemet et al. (2010). Thompson et al. (2014a) examined the same 
policies and particulate matter reductions studied here. They estimated the effects of mortalities 
(and not morbidities), which were valued using a VSL approach, yielding $105/tCO2 for the 
CAT and $186/tCO2 for the CES. Our results also fall at the low end of the range of $2–
$196/tCO2 from 37 studies of air quality co-benefits of climate policy reviewed by Nemet et al. 
(2010), who note that the higher values of this range derived primarily from developing nations. 
We attribute this primarily to our treatment of mortality, in addition to our relatively clean setting 
and moderate policy stringency. In spite of our conservative valuation approach and policy 
setting, we find that air quality co-benefits can “pay for” 110% (40% to 190%) of the costs of a 
CAT, indicating the importance of co-benefits even in developed nations.   
Our conclusions agree with and complement previous findings on the air quality co-benefits 
of climate policy. Air quality co-benefits are significant for both climate and energy policies, 
especially in regions with high pollutant emissions. The CAT policy is the lower-cost option per 
ton of CO2 abated. The CES, which targets the polluting energy sector, reduces more fine 
particulate matter. However, we observe that the CES yields similar co-benefits to the CAT at 30 
times the cost. When modeling the effects of a healthier labor force, ancillary pollution 
reductions have welfare impacts that are nearly commensurate with policy costs for cost-
effective, national quantity instruments, like a cap–and–trade policy. 
Our approach yields complementary insights to past work by representing the impacts of a 
healthier labor force within different, interconnected regions. By allowing for market interactions 
and tracking labor effects, our approach suggests that the welfare effects of mortality are 
distributed differently than mortalities themselves. While mortality is a good predictor of co-
benefits in a region, using a single value for the welfare impact of mortality would over- or 
underestimate shares of co-benefits by up to 25%. That difference could switch the calculation of 
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which policy – the CAT or the CES – yields higher co-benefits in certain regions, like New 
York. Traditional co-benefits analyses value mortalities directly, and will not capture these 
interregional differences and inter-market economic interactions that can serve to raise or lower 
co-benefits in a given region.  
Our modeling approach yields insights rather than predictions of policy impacts. It relies on 
simplified production and behavior, and there are relevant processes we do not capture, such as 
future climate and future air quality. There are also uncertainties in the processes we do capture, 
for example, in our health impacts, valuations, economic growth, and the costs of low-carbon 
technologies. Some of these uncertainties are explored through sensitivity analysis by Thompson 
et al. (2014a). Each of these factors is likely to alter our estimate of the mean and range of co-
benefits, but not the conclusion that they can be important compared to policy costs for a CAT.  
4.1 Implications for Policy Analysis 
This work has implications for the design and evaluation of domestic carbon policies. Our 
results indicate that particulate matter reductions are sufficient to completely offset the costs of 
efficient carbon policy instruments, like a national cap–and–trade program. In this study, co-
benefits transform the CAT’s cumulative welfare impact from a net loss of -$8 billion 2005$ to a 
net gain of $1 billion 2005$. They also transfer gains from the West to the East, thereby 
increasing the set of regional “winners” to include the Northeast. Co-benefits exceed the costs of 
the CAT despite consisting of welfare impacts of mortality represented simply by a reduction in 
labor supply for a single year, and of morbidity represented by a change in the demand for health 
services. This approach captures interregional differences in the effect of mortality on welfare, 
which, compared to using a single valuation of mortality, can alter the calculation of which 
policy yields greater co-benefits in a region. This approach also predicts relatively higher gains 
per unit of pollution reduction in high-productivity regions like New York, and lower gains in 
lower-productivity regions like Texas. This approach does not replace the use of VSL to value 
reduced mortalities, but it does identify interregional differences in the welfare impacts resulting 
from pollution-related labor impacts.  
Regional planners might note that regional costs and co-benefits are affected by interregional 
differences and interactions, and not just local impacts. Flows across regions of pollutants and 
goods (including energy and CO2 permits) also affect costs and co-benefits within a region. To 
maximize welfare under each national policy constraint, different regions will realize different 
CO2 reductions and compliance costs. Some regions may mitigate little to no CO2 if more cost-
effective reductions are available elsewhere; for example, both New England and North Central 
reduce little to no CO2 under the CES. At the same time, flows of pollutants, interregional 
differences in labor productivity and supply, and market interactions affect the pattern of co-
benefits. New England has high benefits per ton under the CES both from its low reductions of 
CO2, and its relatively high co-benefits as its upwind regions reduce fine particulate matter.  
In future studies, we can apply this new framework directly to explore the air quality impacts 
of other climate or energy policies. We can explore other pricing instruments, such as a carbon 
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tax, or regional instruments like a California CAT (as were previously studied with USREP in 
Rausch et al., 2011 and Caron et al., 2012; the co-benefits of California’s AB32 were also 
studied by Zapata et al., 2013). We can examine the air quality impacts of carbon tax swap 
policies that use revenue from a carbon price to reduce distortionary taxes (as studied with 
USREP in Rausch et al., 2011 and Rausch and Reilly, 2012). Building on the work presented 
here, we could use our approach iteratively to quantify feedbacks between air quality and private 
consumption, the importance of which are discussed, for example, in Smith and Carbone (2007) 
and Goulder and Williams (2003).   
Next, we can extend our work in order to better understand the interactions of air pollution 
with US environmental and energy policy. We can use our detailed air quality modeling system 
to include other pollutants, such as ozone, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxides. By combining 
those pollutants with an endogenous representation of pollution abatement (as in Nam et al., 
2013), we can explore the interaction of climate and air quality policy. This includes avoided 
pollution mitigation costs, potentially competing effects of markets for carbon and pollution, and 
potentially diminishing co-benefits as air quality improves. With this economy-wide, integrated 
assessment framework as a basis, we can quantify consistent air quality implications and their 
effect on the efficiency and distribution of domestic energy and environmental policy.  
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